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gust 2018, ongoing outbreaks of African Swine Fever (ASF), a highly contagious and
deadly disease affecting pigs, have hit China’s livestock industries and wiped out 40%
of China’s pigs. We leverage data on daily stock returns from 25 major publicly listed
firms from China and eight major pork-exporting countries to provide the first sys-
tematic analysis of the firm-level economic impacts of the outbreaks. We find that on
average announcements of ASF outbreaks have led to positive and significant stock
returns for both Chinese and international hog companies. Notably, Chinese hog com-
panies on average enjoyed 10%–40% of cumulative abnormal returns during the 2019
Chinese Spring Festival, a peak demand season for pork. We show that larger hog firms
tend to capture greater positive stock returns. Our results suggest opportunities for
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1 Introduction
Pork dominates China’s meat consumption and is the signature staple food with critical
significance for its national security. Domestic production supplies more than 95% of China’s
pork (Shao et al. 2018), yet the remaining 5% creates an annual demand for over 2 million
tons of pork from the global hog market, accounting for a quarter of the entire global pork
exports in 2017 (USDA-FAS 2020). On August 2, 2018, China confirmed its first outbreak
of the highly contagious African Swine Fever (ASF), which causes almost certain death in
pigs (Liu et al. 2019; Mallapaty 2019; Chand 2020). By June 5, 2020, China’s Ministry of
Agriculture and Rural Affairs of China (MARA) had reported more than 177 ASF outbreaks,
which resulted in an almost 40% reduction in hog and sow inventories. This represents a
loss of over 100 million pigs in China, almost one-fifth of the pigs across the globe. ASF
outbreaks have caused pork prices to skyrocket and triggered public concerns about food
availability and affordability (Saefong 2018). At the same time, hog inventory losses have
forced China to rely more on pork and other meat imports, causing major disruptions to
China’s food production and global protein trade patterns.
Recent projections from global economic models show that ASF outbreaks will cause
significant impacts on prices of major food and animal feed products, calorie availability
(Mason-D’Croz et al. 2020; Tian and von Cramon-Taubadel 2020), and pork exports (Car-
riquiry et al. 2020). However, research has yet to explore the welfare consequences for
individual food firms from ASF outbreaks. Since the fall of 2018, outbreak announcements
have signaled severe hog and sow inventory shortages, and as a result many Chinese hog
firms’ stock prices have risen dramatically. The resulting gain in shareholders’ wealth may
provide avenues for expansion and upgrade of the food industry and further transforms the
food supply chain.
This study investigates the financial impacts of China’s ASF outbreaks by quantifying
their effects on stock returns for both Chinese and global hog firms. We exploit the frequent
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announcements of ASF outbreaks from August 2018 to September 2019 by the Chinese 
government and use an event study approach to quantify the responses of 25 publicly listed 
hog firms’ daily stock returns, which include 10 Chinese companies and 15 global companies 
from eight major pork-exporting countries. This allows us to measure ASF outbreaks’ firm-
level costs and/or benefits in the form of abnormal stock price reactions as compared to the 
hypothetical scenario in an ASF-free China. We quantify and investigate the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) and cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) induced by 
ASF outbreaks. We break our sample into four distinct estimation periods: 1) August 2018 
when ASF outbreaks first broke out in northeast China; 2) September to December 2018 
with rapid spread to multiple provinces; 3) January to February 2019, the Spring Festival, 
which is a peak demand season; and 4) March to September 2019, when China’s pork 
prices skyrocketed and pork imports significantly increased. Finally, taking advantage of 
the longitudinal aspect of our data, we also estimate pooled OLS regressions to investigate 
which firm-level and socioeconomic characteristics could explain the variation of abnormal 
stock returns measured by CARs, and whether these relationships evolve over time.
We find that on average the announcements on ASF outbreaks led to positive and signifi-
cant stock returns for both Chinese and international hog companies. Only in the beginning 
of the outbreaks could we observe detectable drag in stock returns for Chinese hog firms. In 
particular, we find that within 15 days an ASF event was announced, Chinese hog companies 
had on average enjoyed 10% to 40% of cumulative abnormal returns during the 2019 Chinese 
Spring Festival. Meanwhile, the magnitude of the positive cumulative abnormal returns for 
international hog firms is relatively modest, averaging 1% to 10%. We consistently find that 
larger firms, both Chinese and global, tend to enjoy greater returns across different subsample 
periods.
Our paper reveals important policy implications for Chinese and global hog industries. 
Importantly, despite dramatic cuts in China’s current pork-producing capacity, ASF out-
breaks may present long-awaited opportunities for consolidation and modernization in China’s
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hog industry. In particular, the Chinese hog industry will be more concentrated and reliant
on large-scale farms as ASF disproportionately affected smaller-scale and backyard produc-
ers. This could improve both the bio-security and efficiency of future Chinese meat pro-
duction. Leveraging the positive stock returns, we also discover a speed-up of the supply
chain integration, with larger hog companies acquiring meat processing, pig breeding, and
transportation sectors, especially the cold chain logistics transporting meat directly rather
than live animals.
Our study contributes to the literature in two important ways. We provide the first sys-
tematic analysis of the economic impacts of China’s ASF outbreaks on the hog industry in
China and other pork-exporting countries. Our findings have global significance for the food
sector, given that global pork exports as a whole are insufficient to fill the production gaps
created by ASF with pork accounting for more than 60% of Chinese meat consumption. In
addition, these outbreaks highlight the value of bio-secure, large-scale production facilities,
which will play a bigger role in meeting China’s future meat demand. Our ex post firm-
level analysis complements previous global economic models by focusing on firm-level price
dynamics as opposed to ex ante projections relying on hypothetical scenarios based on coun-
tries or aggregated commodities, which often require strong parametrization assumptions
(van Tongeren et al. 2001; Liu et al. 2004).
The other contribution of our study is that it reveals the importance of food markets’
supply-side changes in explaining these hog firms’ stock price responses. Previous studies
on firm-level stock price responses find that affected firms’ stock prices and returns tend
to drop following both animal disease outbreaks (Jin and Kim 2008; Pendell and Cho 2013;
Thompson et al. 2019) and food recalls and scandals (Thomsen and McKenzie 2001; Pozo and
Schroeder 2016). Consumer responses and market demand-side factors have largely driven
these drops. However, ASF is not contagious to human (Mallapaty 2019; Chand 2020; Wang
et al. 2019); in addition, Chinese consumers have inelastic demand for meat products, and
only slightly reduce pork consumption when facing price hikes (Zhang et al. 2018). These
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facts, together with the drastic hog and sow inventory loss from ASF outbreaks, thus lead
to skyrocketing pork prices and eventually drive our results.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we provide a background on the
ASF outbreaks in China and relevant policies in the hog sector leading up to the outbreaks.
Section 3 describes the research methodology and data. Results and policy implications
follow in sections 4 and 5. Section 6 summarizes the study and discusses future research
directions.
2 Background
ASF is a highly contagious disease that affects domesticated and wild pigs of all ages. Infected
animals usually experience high fever, anorexia, lethargy, weakness, and recumbency, and
most die within 10 days of infection (Spickler 2019). The ASF virus persists in distinct
cycles - traditionally, the sylvatic cycle, the tick-pig cycle, the domestic (pig-pig) cycle, and
the recently confirmed wild boar cycle (Beltrán-Alcrudo et al. 2017). The most commonly
reported ASF outbreaks in domestic pigs is in the domestic cycle. In this cycle, the ASF virus
may spread through direct contact via the oro-nasal route after contact with excretions from
infected pigs, through the ingestion of pork or other contaminated products, or indirectly
through fomites (Beltrán-Alcrudo et al. 2017). Currently, there is no approved vaccine or
treatment for ASF. Pigs in Africa have been subject to the disease since the early 20th
century, and it spread to Europe in the 1950s. Eastern Europe and Russia have experienced
massive economic harm due to ASF. Over 800,000 hogs died of the disease in Russia between
2007 and 2017 (Kolbasov et al. 2018).
China’s first outbreak of ASF was discovered in Liaoning province in northeastern China
in early August 2018. Its source is not clear, but it is the same strain prevalent in Russia
(Zhou et al. 2018). From August to late September of 2018, there were ASF outbreaks scat-
tered throughout northern and central China, and eight concentrated outbreaks in Anhui
4
province in southern China. By late October of 2018, the outbreak had reached the south-
western province of Yunnan. While initially all outbreaks affected smaller farms with less
than 1,000 pigs in their inventory, seven outbreaks in October 2018 involved producers with
more than 1,000 pigs. The three largest of them had 19,938, 7,684, and 6,640 hogs, respec-
tively. Outbreaks have been slowing, with more than 20 outbreaks per month in November
and December of 2018 and fewer than 10 outbreaks per month in 2019. A dramatic decrease
in ASF outbreaks has been observed in the first quarter of 2020. Up to March 5, 2020, only
one outbreak had been confirmed, compared to 12 outbreaks during the same period in 2019.
From March 5 to April 19, 2020, however, 13 ASF outbreaks have been reported nationwide,
killing a total of 1,313 live pigs and mainly related to live pig or pork product transport. In
the same period last year, there were 24 outbreaks that killed 242,200 animals. According to
China’s Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of China, by June 5, 2020, 177 outbreaks
of ASF across 28 provinces had been confirmed, causing 20,729 confirmed infections and
14,516 pig deaths (MARA, 2020).
To curb the spread of ASF, millions of pigs have been culled in China. The government
has also banned cross-province hog and pork transportation, which has significantly reduced
live hog prices for producers in major pork-producing areas (Shao et al., 2018). The ban has
effectively prevented many slaughterhouses and meat processing factories from producing
pork. This sharp hog inventory decline follows a decline mandated by environmental regula-
tions of livestock production that led to the decline of hog inventory reduction by around 20
million head in the southern provinces in its first year of implementation alone.1 (Bai et al.
2018; Bai et al. 2019).
The top panel of Figure 1 shows hog inventory trends, pork imports and prices of live pig
1A series of location-based environmental regulations restricting hog production, especially in the south-
eastern provinces, as a means to prevent and control water pollution has been put into place since 2015.
They began with China’s 13th Five-Year-Plan for Agriculture in 2015, which announced that ”hog produc-
tion should move away from waterways and crowded urban populations,” shifting production to the west
and northeast. Another related regulation divides China’s provinces into the Development Control Zone and
Non-development Control Zone in terms of their suitability for hog production.
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and pork in China since the first ASF outbreak, and the bottom panel shows the number 
of monthly outbreaks in the same period. According to Figure 1, Chinese hog inventory 
decreased by 41%, or 130 million pigs, from November 2018 to September 2019. During 
these eleven months, sow inventory, which determines production capacity in the next year, 
also decreased by 37% or 11 million sows. China’s hog prices started rising in April 2019 
and surged 180% over the next six months due to the severe shortage in pork supply. China 
accounts for about half of the world’s pork consumption; therefore, China’s pork shortage 
also led to an urgent need to import pork from the global market. According to the General 
Administration of Customs, in comparison to August 2018, China’s pork imports surged 
almost 125% in March 2019 and 170% in May of that year, and is slated to reach historic 
level this year.
3 Methodology and Data
The Event Study Method. We evaluate stock price responses of Chinese and global pork 
producers to China’s ASF announcements from August 2, 2018 to September 10, 2019. We 
combine ASF announcement records with daily stock price and stock market price index data 
and employ an event study approach to look for a statistically significant reaction to ASF 
announcements in financial markets. The event study method is commonly used in the 
literature to measure a given event’s financial impacts on a firm’s stock prices. The underlying 
assumption is that the market processes information related to events in an efficient and 
unbiased manner (Fama et al. 1969). It can be used to measure the impact of events that affect 
the market value of a firm whether they are within the firm’s control (e.g., announcements of 
annual reports) or outside its control (e.g., MARA’s ASF announcements).
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We divide the timeline for a specific ASF announcement into two mutually exclusive
subperiods: the estimation window and event window. The estimation window consists of
a period of pre-ASF-event trading days t ∈ [T0, T1], where T0 and T1 represent the start
and end times of the pre-ASF estimation window. This serves to estimate the relationship
between a hog firm’s stock price movement and that of the market index in the absence
of an ASF event. The common practice in the literature defines the estimation window as
245 trading days immediately prior to an event, assuming those days are free of the same
event. As our sample period spans August 2018 to September 2019 and includes 138 ASF
events, this assumption is likely violated, as evidenced by Figure 1. Therefore, we define
the estimation window as 245 trading days prior to the date a year prior to the actual ASF
event date. For example, the estimation window for the ASF outbreak on June 3, 2019 is
the 245 trading days from June 2, 2017 (T0) to June 2, 2018 (T1), a period that does not
contain ASF events. As such, we rely on an ASF-outbreak-free period to establish baseline
stock returns for a firm in the absence of ASF events and yet still account for the dynamics
of hog production cycles (Chavas and Holt, 1991).2 For each ASF event announced on the
day T2, the event window period of t ∈ [T2 + 1, T3] starts one day after each ASF event day
and consists of the following 15 trading days in our main specification (i.e., T3 = T2+16). As
ASF announcements could be issued at any time of the day, not just during trading times,
the start date of the event window is set one day after the event day.
Estimating Abnormal Stock Returns. An event study approach quantifies an event’s
economic impact on the so-called abnormal returns through statistical regressions. We ex-
press the abnormal return for every firm i as:
ARit = Rit − E[Rit
∣∣It], (1)
2There are still three ASF events in the last subperiod (March 2019 to September 2019) where the
estimation windows still contain at least one prior outbreak: August 8th, August 26th, and September 10th.
By excluding these three events our results still hold. This is likely because there were only five outbreaks
in August 2018, and the market had not started reacting to the outbreaks in the early stages.
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where Rit = ln(
Pt
Pt−1
) is the actual stock return at date t, and E(Rit
∣∣It) is the expected normal
return conditional on information It, which enables us to predict the expected return if the
event did not occur. Therefore, it is necessary to estimate the expected normal return in
order to calculate abnormal returns. We use the market model, which is the most frequently
used expected return model in practice (MacKinlay 1997), to estimate E(Rit
∣∣It). The market
model assumes that stock returns are a function of an overall market index and expects a
deviation from this relationship in the presence of an event. In the market model, for each
firm i, returns are given by
Rit = αi + βi ×Rmt + εi, for all t ∈ [T0, T1], (2)
where Rmt is the index return of the stock market in which the firm’s stocks are publicly
traded at time t; αi and βi are parameters to be estimated; and εi is the error term, which is
assumed to be independent and normally distributed with zero mean. Daily normal returns
of firm i in the event window (i.e., 15 post-event trading days starting one day after the
announcement date) are then predicted according to
E[Rit
∣∣It] = α̂i + β̂i ×Rmt, for all t ∈ [T2 + 1, T3]. (3)
Following Eq. (1), we then obtain the daily abnormal returns of firm i in the event window:
ARit = Rit − (α̂i + β̂i ×Rmt), for all t ∈ [T2 + 1, T3]. (4)
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns and Hypothesis Testing. Finally, using the
daily abnormal returns obtained from Eq. (4), we calculate the cumulative average abnormal
returns (CAAR), the mean values of N ASF announcements, and our variable of interest.
This requires aggregating the abnormal returns both over time and over ASF events. For
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where T2 + 1 ≤ τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ T3. The magnitude of CAARi(τ1, τ2) reflects the impact of ASF
announcements on firm i’s stock returns. We focus on the sample period from August 2018
to September 2019, which covers a full year after China’s first ASF outbreak. We divide the
sample period into four groups: (a) August 2018, when ASF outbreaks first occurred in a
small number of farms in northeastern China; (b) September 2018 to December 2018, when
ASF outbreaks quickly spread to multiple provinces; (c) January 2019 to February 2019,
when national leaders realized the severity of the problem due to more frequent consumer
complaints about higher pork prices and pork shortages during the Chinese Spring Festival;
and (d) March 2019 to September 2019, when China’s pork prices skyrocketed and pork
imports significantly increased. The four subperiods contain 5, 85, 11, and 37 ASF event
announcements, respectively.
We also derive cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), which is calculated as the accumula-
tion day by day of abnormal returns following an ASF event obtained from Eq. (4). For each
ASF announcement, we calculate 15 CARs, with each measure corresponding to abnormal
returns accumulated for 1 day, 2 days, and so on up to 15 days after the announcement.
While the CAAR provides an overall picture of ASF outbreak impacts, the CAR allows
us to investigate heterogeneous effects across individual firms. Both CAR and CAAR are
commonly used event-study economic variables for evaluating an event’s financial effect on
affected firms (Fama et al. 1969; Corrado 2011).
To determine whether the CAAR is significantly different from zero in the statistical
sense, which would imply that ASF announcements do impact firms’ stock returns, we con-
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duct a hypothesis test formally stated as follows:
H0 : CAARi(τ1, τ2) = 0
H1 : CAARi(τ1, τ2) 6= 0.
(6)
The null hypothesis (H0) maintains that ASF announcements do not have a statistically
significant impact on stock returns over a time interval τ = [τ1, τ2] and therefore we cannot
reject that CAARi(τ1, τ2) = 0, whereas the alternative hypothesis (H1) suggests the presence
of abnormal returns over a time interval τ = [τ1, τ2], resulting in a non-zero CAARi(τ1, τ2).
A significant clustering problem can rise when event windows of different ASF events
overlap in time; thus, one concern is that ASF announcements occurred frequently during
our study period. Indeed, from August 2, 2018 to September 10, 2019, MARA issued a total
of 138 announcements, on average more than once every three days. Thus, we employ the
adjusted Boehmer et al. (1991) t-test (hereafter adjusted BMP t-test), proposed by Kolari
and Pynnönen (2010), to examine the null hypothesis (H0) in Eq. (6). This test statistic is
commonly used in the literature to account for cross-correlation (Boehmer et al. 1991; Kolari
and Pynnönen 2010; Pozo and Schroeder 2016).3
Explaining Cumulative Abnormal Returns. We further investigate the factors de-
termining the magnitude of abnormal returns within the event window. The aim of this
assessment is to examine how the ASF announcement details and firm characteristics influ-
ence the abnormal stock returns. As such, we use CAR as the outcome of interest, and focus
on the CAR values that accumulate abnormal returns over 15 days after the outbreak. We
follow Pozo and Schroeder (2016) to employ the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model
separately for Chinese hog firms and foreign hog firms.
For each ASF event j and each firm i, and t days after an ASF event where t ∈ [T2+1, τ2],
3The derivation of the adjusted BMP t-test is presented in the online appendix.
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we estimate the following pooled OLS model for Chinese hog firms:
CARjit = φ0 + φ1Trade V olumejit + φ2Large Scale Farmj + (7)
φ3Infected P igsj + φ4Same Countyji +
φ5Baidu Searchjit + φ6Feeder P ig Pricejt + εjit.
CAR is the rolling sum of abnormal returns since each ASF announcement. Trade V olume
is daily trading volume. It captures the firm size and capacity, which is measured by the
percentage of outstanding shares trade for that day. Large Scale Farm is a binary indicator
common to all firms that equals one if the ASF outbreak occurred in a large-scale pig farm
with at least 500 pigs. Infected P igs is the number of infected pigs reported from the ASF
announcement. Because all Chinese hog firms in our analysis generally have large-scale hog
facilities, we hypothesize greater impacts on their stock returns when an outbreak occurs in
large-scale farms and when more pigs are infected. Same County is a binary indicator that
equals one if the firm has one or more hog facilities in a single county that reported an ASF
outbreak, capturing the disproportionate impacts on a firm when its facilities are subject
to greater risk by being closer to the contaminated hog farm. Baidu Search is the daily
number of searches on ”African Swine Fever” on Baidu, which captures the general interest
or concerns among the public regarding ASF.4 Finally, Feeder P ig Price is Chinese daily
feeder pig prices, which we use as the proxy for the production costs for all Chinese hog
producing firms.
We estimate a similar model for foreign hog firms:
CARjit = γ0 + γ1Trade V olumejit + γ2Infected P igsj + (8)
γ3Google Searchjit + Trade Costj + εjit.
4Google is prohibited in China. Baidu is one of the most commonly used search engine in China.
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CAR, Trade V olume, and Infected P igs follow the same definitions as in Eq. (7). We
posit the same hypothesis for foreign firms: that a larger impact on a CAR should be
associated with an outbreak involving more infected hogs. Google Search is defined similarly
as Baidu Search, but refers to daily searches of ”African Swine Fever” on Google. Some
independent variables in Eq. (7) are dropped because none of the 15 foreign hog companies
have facilities in infected Chinese counties. Instead, we include the differential trading cost
from these food exporters to China, commonly included in gravity models of trade, by using
a country-specific trade cost measures (Novy, 2013).
For both Chinese and foreign firms, We estimate the regressions separately for each of
the four subperiods as well as for the full sample. Given that we estimate a pooled OLS
model, we include day-since-announcement dummy variables in all equations to account for
potential serial correlation within the event window for each ASF outbreak. We further
include month and year dummy variables in the full sample regressions to capture general
macroeconomic and commodity fluctuations that contribute the firms’ stock returns, as the
sample period spans one year long.
Data Sources. Our analysis relies on two main data sources: ASF announcements and stock
prices. We collect ASF announcement data from China’s MARA homepage. Following each
ASF outbreak, MARA announces the county-level location and specific site (i.e., pig farm,
slaughterhouse, or transport vehicle) of event detection, the number of hogs in inventory,
and the number of infected and dead pigs. MARA issued a total of 138 ASF announcements
during our study period (MARA, 2020). We collect daily stock price data from Yahoo
Finance. Of those listed on stock markets, we select China’s top 10 pork producers and 15
global pork producers from eight countries that export pork to China.5 Of these, with China
excluded, the remaining eight pork-exporting countries represent 32% of global pork exports
in 2018.6 For each hog company, we collect the stock price index for the market in which
5See Appendix Table A.2 for the complete list of the Chinese and global hog producers included in the
analysis.
6This is based on authors’ own calculation using data from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statis-
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the company’s stocks are traded, its headquarters’ location, and the locations of all its hog
facilities to determine whether a particular ASF outbreak affects the company. The daily
feeder pig prices are collected from the Chinese Association of Animal Agriculture.
4 Results
ASF outbreaks have had a dramatic impact on China’s hog and pork markets, as well as
global food trade. As discussed earlier in Figure 1, China’s hog inventory decreased by more
than 40% from the end of 2018 to September 2019, which drove up both hog and pork prices
and the demand for pork import. Specifically, hog and pork prices both rose by more than
20 CNY/kg one year after the first ASF outbreak.
Figure 2 uses boxplots to show how the decline in China’s hog inventory and the associ-
ated increase in imported meat demand translated into an upswing in Chinese and foreign
hog firms’ stock prices. Using the stock prices of August 1, 2018 as a benchmark, Figure 2
shows stock price trajectories from August 2018 to September 2019 for the 10 largest Chi-
nese hog firms in the top panel and 15 major foreign hog firms in the bottom panel. We
include composite stock market changes over the same time to illustrate the magnitude of
stock price movements for these food firms relative to the general market.
Figure 2 shows that Chinese hog firms’ stock prices experienced a slight decline imme-
diately after the first ASF announcement in 2018, then increased dramatically the following
year. We note that the magnitude of the daily stock price increase among the 10 Chinese hog
firms greatly exceeds the increases in the pork and pig prices presented in Figure 1. Specifi-
cally, when compared to the August 2018 baseline, Figure 2 shows a 50%–300% rise in stock
prices starting February 2019, during which the Chinese Spring Festival took place—a peak
demand season for pork. In contrast, overall stock market trends only show a modest increase
during the same period. The dramatic rise might reflect investors’ expectations of a severe
tics Database (Standard International Trade Classification: Meat of swine, fresh, chilled or frozen).
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pork shortage. On the other hand, global hog firms’ stock prices, shown in the bottom panel 
of Figure 2, also experienced substantial and consistent increases, but of a smaller magnitude 
than Chinese hog firms. The firm-level stock price hikes for global hog firms mainly reflect 
the boost in China’s imported pork demand, and are significantly greater than the general 
market movements for the United States and Europe, but not much larger than those for 
Brazil. This is because Brazil’s stock market experienced much stronger surges from China’s 
elevated demand for Brazilian soybeans to cope with the U.S.-China trade war.
While Figure 2 provides suggestive evidence of positive financial impacts for hog compa-
nies, it could be biased, as it ignores the fluctuations and seasonality of hog companies’ stock 
price changes even in the absence of ASF outbreaks. The event study approach allows us to 
isolate ASF outbreak effects in the form of abnormal stock returns. Figure 3 shows that 
CAAR for Chinese hog companies exhibited different patterns as ASF triggered market con-
cerns about the pork supply and shortages: Immediately after each ASF announcement, the 
average Chinese hog company saw a negative CAAR over a 15-day period in August 2018, 
which is similar to the adverse stock movements commonly observed following a food recall or 
food safety event (Thomsen and McKenzie 2001; Pozo and Schroeder 2016; Jin and Kim 2008; 
Pendell and Cho 2013; Thompson et al. 2019). However, the initial negative shocks, on 
average, are of lower magnitude, possibly because ASF does not affect human health, and thus 
did not trigger meaningful adverse demand-side impacts on firm profitability. Figure 3 further 
shows that as time went on with continued ASF outbreaks, concerns over pork supply, which 
accounts for over 60% of China’s meat consumption, deepened, resulting in anticipated 
surges of at least 5% in stock returns within 15 days after each outbreak. In particular, the 
tremendous shortages in the pork supply during January-February 2019, when the Chinese 
Spring Festival took place, led to 10% in CAAR within 10 days after an ASF announcement 
and surged to almost 20% over the 15-day span.
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Firm-level stock price data allow us to further examine the heterogeneous effects on stock 
returns across hog firms. Using boxplots, Figure 4 shows individual distributions of CAR 
values for each of the 10 Chinese hog firms following every ASF outbreak during the four 
subsample periods and the overall statistical significance of the mean across firm-level CAR 
values.7 Consistent with the overall effect on CAAR, we observe only modest negative effects 
on CAR for most firms in August 2018. Our findings are consistent with other food recall 
studies in terms of the direction and magnitude of the effects. Likewise, we observe that CAR 
values for firms were all significantly positive following ASF events, except for one company, 
and that the effects were of higher magnitude from January to February 2019, similar to the 
findings shown in Figure 3. Figure 4c shows that Chinese hog companies, such as Zhengbang 
Tech, New Wellful, and Tangrenshen Group, saw average ASF-induced stock returns reach as 
high as 20%-40%, echoing our earlier demonstration that strong, positive stock returns reflect 
concerns over pork supply shortages, especially during a peak demand season. We also note 
that previous food recall and animal disease outbreak studies typically report stock returns at 
less than 5% (Thomsen and McKenzie 2001; Pozo and Schroeder 2016). Our findings of 
substantial positive returns reveal the importance of pork for Chinese consumers’ daily diet 
and the severity of ASF outbreaks.
In contrast to Chinese hog firms, Figure 5 shows that all major global pork producers 
benefited from the severe reduction in China’s domestic hog supply and the resulting surge in 
pork and meat import demand, which we observe consistently in all four subsample
7Appendix Table A.1 provides test results that correspond to Chinse and foreign individual firm results
that correspond to Figure 4 and 6, and also test results for Chinese firms’ and foreign firms’ CAAR that
correspond to Figure 3 and 5.
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periods. We also find that foreign hog producers benefited the most during the Chinese 
Spring Festival, much as Chinese firms did. However, average CAAR values for global pork 
producers are much more modest than domestic Chinese hog companies’, ranging from less 
than 1% to 2.5% 15 event days after ASF announcements. This is likely because, although 
China’s pork imports increased significantly following outbreaks, China’s total annual pork 
imports (3 million tons in 2019), only represent about 6% of total domestic pork consumption. 
In other words, the delayed surge in pork imports helps explain the positive, yet modest, 
stock returns.
Figure 6 helps explain the disparity in the level of disease outbreak effects by investigating 
firm-level CAR values for foreign companies. Similar to Figure 4, Figure 6 presents CAR 
values for individual companies over the first 15 days following each ASF announcement 
during the four subsample periods. We find that global hog companies initially exhibited 
mixed, and often insignificant, stock price responses to China’s ASF outbreaks, which in part 
reflects uncertainty about the severity of impacts on China’s hog production and import 
demand. As pork supply shortages in China become evident, especially during and after the 
2019 Spring Festival, most global hog companies enjoy modest, yet positive, stock returns 
every time China reports more ASF outbreaks. We note that there are large variations in firm-
level stock returns in every period, and when averaging these firm-level returns we observe a 
smaller overall effect, as seen in Figure 5. However, we also observe that some global hog 
producers with larger Chinese market shares, especially Brazilian, Russian, Finnish, Thai, and 
Canadian firms, did experience greater positive stock returns after the Chinese New Year, 
which, together with our findings from Chinese firms, demonstrates that severe pork shortages 
induced more Chinese pork imports.
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To examine if the U.S.-China trade war, which covers our entire estimation period, might
confound our results for foreign hog companies—especially U.S., Brazilian, and Canadian
firms—we present firm-level stock returns following ASF outbreaks for one Canadian, three
U.S., and two Brazilian hog companies in Appendix Figure A.1. The figure shows that U.S.
hog companies did suffer, and Brazilian hog companies saw surging stock returns, when China
announced retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports. Similarly, Canadian stock returns fell following
the tension between China and Canada over the arrest of a top Huawei executive, with
corresponding bumps in Brazilian and U.S. stock returns. However, even though changes
in trade situations affect immediate stock responses, they do not alter our fundamental
findings of positive, yet moderate, stock returns for global hog companies following China’s
ASF outbreaks. The U.S.-China trade war resulted in more variations and uncertainty in
stock return responses by U.S. firms, while Brazilian companies, in general, enjoyed stable,
positive stock returns when China’s ASF outbreaks worsened.
Finally, we present our pooled OLS regression results on explaining the sources of ab-
normal returns during each of the four subperiods, as well as the full sample period pooling
all data together. Table 1 shows that Chinese hog firms with larger trading volumes in the
stock market tend to enjoy greater stock returns following each ASF outbreak. The effect
is strongest in the second subperiod, when intensive outbreaks occurred frequently.8 We
observe mixed findings of the effects of whether the outbreak was detected in a large farm
and the number of infected pigs on CAR in the earlier periods, but they became positive
after early 2019. These results are consistent with the evidence from our event study for
Chinese hog firms: the initial negative shock was overwhelmed by concerns over pork supply
reduction, leading to stronger abnormal returns. We also observe suggestive yet inconclusive
evidence of negative impacts on stock returns following ASF outbreaks, especially during
the 2019 Chinese New Year, if the outbreaks took place within the same region where the
company owns pig farms, and if the public became more aware of the outbreaks. Lastly,
8While statistically insignificant, the negative effect of trading volume on CAR is also consistent, as
larger firms enjoy greater adverse CAR variation.
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whether the company was operating with higher costs generally correlates to a negative im-
pact on the CAR, except for during the Chinese New Year. This exception is likely due to 
the relatively stronger underlying force of increase in the demand for pork.
Much like the results from Chinese hog firms, Table 2 consistently shows that larger stock 
trading volumes are associated with positive stock returns after ASF events for foreign hog 
firms. However, the severity of the event, measured in number of infected pigs, does not 
explain the movement of foreign firms’ stock returns. The same observations seem to apply to 
the trading costs of selected foreign hog firms. On the other hand, the public awareness of ASF 
outbreaks outside of China started to have statistically significant and negative effects on 
CAR for global companies since 2019, which is in line with the development of ASF outbreaks 
in China that the situation gradually deteriorated by the end of 2018 and the beginning of 
2019. The facts that these effects are of marginal magnitude, and that the overall R2 values are 
mostly around 0.05 or below, suggest ASF outbreaks in China did not contribute much to the 
stock market performance of foreign hog firms, as these foreign firms also export to other 
countries besides China. These findings are also supported from the event study results for 
foreign hog firms, where we only observe modest positive abnormal stock returns following 
ASF outbreaks.
5 Policy Implications
ASF outbreaks have had profound and likely long-lasting impacts on the Chinese and global 
hog industry. Our results of positive stock returns for global hog producers are consistent
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with China’s surging meat import demand, which remains strong today. For example, the
2019-2020 U.S. pork exports to China reached a 10-year high, and the momentum is further
building with the U.S.-China phase one trade deal (He et al. 2020). However, despite the
drastic cuts in China’s current pork-producing capacity, these outbreaks might also come
as a blessing in disguise, as they provide long-awaited opportunities for consolidation and
modernization in China’s hog industry.
In particular, ASF outbreaks present three important opportunities that are critical for
the bio-security and efficiency of China’s future meat production. First, the vast majority
of Chinese hog farms directly affected by ASF are small-scale producers; ASF outbreaks
have eliminated over half of China’s small-scale (<300 hogs per farm) farms, which are often
inefficient. Many provinces, such as Liaoning, have banned restocking small-scale farms
with the number of pigs fewer than 300 heads (Sina 2019). As a result, the hog industry
is more concentrated and reliant on large-scale farms. This is consistent with Russia’s ASF
experience, which saw the proportion of pork production in large-scale farms increase from
42% in 2007 to 86% in 2018. The large hog companies we analyze in this study have sped up
investment and acquisition of large-scale hog farms. For example, Wens Foodstuff Group,
the largest hog company in China, announced in November 2019 that it had acquired a large
farm in central China with an annual production capacity of 28,000 sows and 700,000 pigs
(Zhu 2019). Other large companies, like New Hope Group and Zhengbang Technology, show
similar expansion patterns, reflecting overall greater concentration of Chinese hog production
relying on larger-scale hog farms (Sina 2020d).
Second, ASF will accelerate current improvements in China’s pork production efficiency
by further reducing the production cost per unit of pork and upgrading the infrastructure of
the pig farms. Over the past three decades, the United States has reduced sow inventories,
but still produces 60% more pork than it did in 1990 due to technical innovations in both
breeding and genetic research as well as improvements in nutrition and barn management
practices (USDA-ERS 2016). Arguably, the larger-scale commercial hog farms are more
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efficient in production than the backyard production that represented 40% of the Chinese hog
inventories before the African Swine Fever (Essig 2020). Furthermore, capital gains through
the positive stock returns incentivized investments and upgrades of the large hog companies
analyzed in our paper. For example, Wens Foodstuff Group announced in early 2020 that it
would build a farm following its fourth-generation pig farming model in Guangdong Province,
which uses less land and has better emission and waste treatments and a high degree of
breeding automation (Sina 2020c). At the same time, companies like Muyuan Foods are
investing to upgrade pig buildings with independent ventilation and centralized feeding,
and to develop a pig disease prediction model using artificial intelligence technologies (Sina
2020b). These innovations could lead to a more efficient and globally competitive hog sector
in China.
Third, ASF outbreaks have spurred deeper supply chain integration and structural trans-
formation of China’s food sector. In particular, the top Chinese pig-breeding companies
have begun entering the slaughtering and processing industry (GlobalMeatNews 2019; Sina
2020a). This shift is due in part to recognition of the fact that 70% of ASF outbreaks are
related to China’s heavily-used live animal transportation system (Watch, 2019). The pop-
ularity of live pig transportation is resulting from Chinese consumers’ long-held preferences
for fresh pork over chilled or frozen pork. ASF outbreaks have served as a wake-up call for
pig breeding companies to enter the slaughtering industry and transition into chilled meat
transportation as cold chain logistics of meat products have improved. Two major cities in
Guangdong province stopped supplying fresh pork in December 2019 in favor of providing
chilled and frozen pork only (Sohu 2018). Hog companies are also increasing the investment
in the feedstuff industry and pig breeding industry (Zhu 2019; Sina 2020a). In other words,
the Chinese hog industries are and will continue to be more concentrated and more vertically
integrated following the ASF outbreaks.
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6 Conclusions
Since 2018, China’s ongoing ASF outbreaks have been among the most consequential events
in the global food sector, and have caused roughly a 20% reduction in the global pig inventory.
Researchers have developed models to assess different disease control practices as well as an
experimental vaccine for this lethal disease (Mallapaty 2020; O’Neill et al. 2020). However,
the impacts of ASF are consequential for global food production and far from over. By
quantifying the abnormal stock returns induced by ASF, we provide the first systematic
evaluation of the unintended financial impacts of China’s ASF outbreaks on Chinese and
global hog companies. We find that, contrary to conventional wisdom, on average, ASF
outbreak announcements led to positive and significant stock returns for both Chinese and
international hog companies. This differs from the past literature on animal disease outbreaks
and food recalls in two ways. First, we could only detect a drop in stock returns for Chinese
hog firms following China’s first ASF outbreak. Second, we find that Chinese hog companies,
on average, enjoyed 10%–40% of cumulative abnormal returns within 15 days of an ASF event
announcement during the 2019 Chinese Spring Festival, which is a peak demand season for
pork. The abnormal return is positive and has a magnitude up to 10 times larger than that
of previous food recall studies (Pozo and Schroeder 2016).
Our findings of positive stock returns following ASF events have important policy impli-
cations. In contrast to other food safety issues, such as China’s 2008 infant formula scandal
and food recalls, worries about supply reductions and shortages resulted in significant and
positive stock returns, as opposed to the negative stock price movements following weakened
demand for recalled or banned food products. Importantly, ASF is proven to not directly
affect human health, and thus it remains largely a supply-side issue. The significance of
pork in Chinese consumers’ diets and the inelastic nature of pork demand fueled criticism of
and debate regarding the expansive 2015–2016 environmental regulations that led to sharp
reductions in hog and sow inventories in southern China. Finally, although key events in
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the U.S.-China trade war could explain some stock return movements, our general find-
ing of modest, yet positive, returns for global hog companies are robust. Our results of
supply-shortage-induced stock returns are consistent with China’s meat import surge, and
also indicative of significant consolidation opportunities by the hog companies analyzed in
our paper, leading to a more concentrated and vertically integrated Chinese hog sector. The
degree to which the Chinese hog industry will consolidate, and the implication for market
outcomes, are both critical issues and are left for further exploration in future work.
We note two important assumptions and limitations regarding the selection of data and
the length of our sample period. First, although more than half of China’s pork imports
come from Europe, we do not consider several giant pork producers in Europe—such as the
Tonnies Group in Germany, Cooperl Arc Atlantique and Aveltis in France, Vall Companys
and Piensos Costa in Spain, Goodvalley and Danish Crown AmbA in Denmark, and Vion
Food Group in the Netherlands—because they are private companies and not publicly traded
on stock markets. However, our analysis of foreign hog companies includes firms in eight
countries in Europe and North and South America, which account for one-third of global
pork exports, and the private firms’ stock returns are somewhat similar to the patterns we
uncover. Second, more than 80% of China’s pork is produced in small-scale or backyard
production, so the 10 Chinese hog companies we analyze typically have better bio-security
measures and do not reflect the performance and profitability of the overall hog industry.
Yet, as discussed earlier, ASF outbreaks will result in more consolidation and modernization
of China’s hog industry and the corresponding food supply chain. Consequently, our analysis
is even more salient in understanding the future of China’s food industry.
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Figure 1: Chinese hog inventory, pork imports, and prices of live hog and pork (top) and ASF
outbreak timeline (bottom)
Notes: In the top figure, the left axis shows monthly hog inventory and pork imports in percentage changes,
using August 2018 as the baseline value of 100; the right axis shows monthly actual live hog and pork prices
(CNY/kg). The number of ASF outbreaks is also aggregated to monthly level in the bottom figure.
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Figure 2: Stock price changes of Chinese and global hog companies following China’s ASF outbreak.
Notes: The top figure shows the percentage changes of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) Composite Index,
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) Component Index, and ChiNext Price Index, and the boxplot of 10 Chinese
pork producers’ stock prices. The bottom figure shows the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Composite
Index, Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100 Index, and Sao Paulo Stock Exchange Bovespa Index,
and the boxplot of 15 global pork producers’ stock prices. 08/03/2018 is the base period in both figures.
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Figure 3: Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of Chinese pork producers for all ASF
announcements
Notes: The vertical axis refers to CAAR values; the horizontal axis displays the event days
since an ASF outbreak (at time 0). For each subsample period, every data point is a
CAAR over a 1-day span, a 2-day span, and so on to a 15-day span since an ASF outbreak,
respectively. The statistical significance of each CAAR is presented in Appendix Table A.1.
28
Figure 4: Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of Chinese companies (a) in 08/2018, (b) from
09/2018 to 12/2018, (c) from 01/2019 to 02/2019, (d) from 03/2019 to 09/2019.
Notes: In each figure, we present the distribution of firm-specific CAR values from all ASF events within each
subsample period. CAR values are calculated by accumulating the abnormal returns from our event-study
model for 15 trading days since each event (τ1 = 1, τ2 = 15). The vertical axis displays the top 10 Chinese
hog firms (in no particular order) and the horizontal axis is CAR values in percentage change (%). Each
box, moving from the left edge to the middle line and to the right edge is the 25% percentile, median, and
75% percentile of the distribution. Whiskers extending from the box connect the minimum and maximum
CAR values. A box highlighted in yellow indicates that the average value is statistically different from zero
from the adjusted BMP t-test under the significance level of 5%, and is blank if otherwise. Each + symbol
in red indicates an outlier that is not included in the test sample.
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Figure 5: Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of foreign pork producers for all ASF
announcements.
Notes: The vertical axis refers to CAAR values; the horizontal axis displays the event days
since an ASF outbreak (at time 0). For each subsample period, every data point is a
CAAR over a 1-day span, a 2-day span, and so on to a 15-day span since an ASF outbreak,
respectively. The statistical significance of each CAAR is presented in Appendix Table A.1.
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Figure 6: Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of foreign companies (a) in 08/2018, (b) from
09/2018 to 12/2018, (c) from 01/2019 to 02/2019, (d) from 03/2019 to 09/2019.
Notes: In each figure, we present the distribution of firm-specific CAR values from all ASF events within each
subsample period. CAR values are calculated by accumulating the abnormal returns from our event-study
model for 15 trading days since each event (τ1 = 1, τ2 = 15). The vertical axis displays 15 major foreign hog
firms (in no particular order) and the horizontal axis is CAR values in percentage change (%). Each box,
moving from the left edge to the middle line and to the right edge is the 25% percentile, median, and 75%
percentile of the distribution. Whiskers extending from the box connect the minimum and maximum CAR
values. A box highlighted in yellow indicates that the average value is statistically different from zero from
the adjusted BMP t-test under the significance level of 5%, and is blank if otherwise. Each + symbol in red
indicates an outlier that is not included in the test sample.
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Trading Volume -0.2990 2.9710** 1.4303* 0.7033* 1.0199***
(1.3625) (0.9163) (0.6926) (0.3527) (0.2591)
Outbreak detected in large-scale pig farm -0.0863** -0.0046 0.0208** 0.0190 0.0010
(0.0267) (0.0057) (0.0088) (0.0347) (0.0042)
The number of infected pigs 0.0473** -0.0054* 0.0084* 0.0284*** 0.0009
(0.0163) (0.0028) (0.0038) (0.0065) (0.0028)
Company’s pig farm in the same county as the outbreak 0.0157 0.0127** -0.0512*** 0.0230 0.0103**
(0.0152) (0.0051) (0.0129) (0.0196) (0.0039)
Baidu searching index 0.0063 -0.0155 -0.0045 0.0310** -0.0013
(0.0058) (0.0120) (0.0169) (0.0101) (0.0058)
Feeder Pig Price 0.0531* -0.0005 0.0173* -0.0050*** -0.0067**
(0.0264) (0.0034) (0.0084) (0.0009) (0.0026)
Intercept -1.4271* 0.1502 -0.3643 -0.1347 0.0217
(0.6664) (0.1068) (0.2745) (0.0816) (0.0585)
Observations 750 12750 1650 5550 20700
Adjusted R2 0.236 0.148 0.429 0.137 0.191
Number of companies 10 10 10 10 10
ASF events 5 85 11 37 138
Day dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month dummies No No No No Yes
Year dummies No No No No Yes
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. In all regressions, the dependent variables are cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). CAR values in all
regressions are calculated using a 15-day event window. Day dummies indicate days since each ASF event, from day 1 to day 15. Standard errors
(in parenthesis) are clustered at company-level.
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Trading Volume 2.8791* 1.3771** 0.1517 2.5656* 1.3381***
(1.3684) (0.5537) (0.3024) (1.2097) (0.3726)
The number of infected pigs 0.0049 0.0015 0.0021 0.0039 0.0004
(0.0052) (0.0038) (0.0020) (0.0038) (0.0021)
Google searching index 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0004** -0.0002** -0.0001**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Trading cost from exporters to China -0.0003 -0.0005** 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0003**
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Intercept 0.0076 0.0416 -0.0067 -0.0078 0.0401
(0.0388) (0.0241) (0.0125) (0.0200) (0.0274)
Observations 1125 19125 2475 8325 31050
Adjusted R2 0.064 0.064 0.033 0.043 0.079
Number of companies 15 15 15 15 15
ASF events 5 85 11 37 138
Day dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month dummies No No No No Yes
Year dummies No No No No Yes
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. In all regressions, the dependent variables are cumulative abnormal returns (CAR).
CAR values in all regressions are calculated using a 15-day event window. Day dummies indicate days since each ASF event,
from day 1 to day 15. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at company-level.
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The Adjusted BMP t-Test
Boehmer et al. (1991) t-test is a widely used test statistic in event studies (Kolari and
Pynnönen 2010; Pozo and Schroeder 2016). Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) proposed a modi-
fication to the Boehmer et al. (1991) t-test (hereafter adjusted BMP t-test) to account for
cross-correlation of the abnormal returns. Using the standardized abnormal returns and
defining r̄ as the average of the sample cross-correlation of the estimation period’s abnormal
returns, we construct the per period adjusted BMP t statistic as
tAB,t = tB,t
√
(1− r̄)/(1 + (N − 1)r̄),
where tAB,t and tB,t are the adjusted and original BMP t statistics, respectively. If the
average return cross-correlation r̄ is zero, the adjusted test statistic reduces to the original
BMP t statistic. Assuming the square-root rule holds for the standard deviation of different
return periods, we can extend this test to measure the cumulative average abnormal returns
(H0 : CAAR = 0):
tAB = tB
√
(1− r̄)/(1 + (N − 1)r̄),
where the new equation for the statistic remains unchanged, except that the subscript t is
now dropped.
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Table A.1: Adjusted BMP t-test Results for CAAR for Chinese and Foreign Hog Firms
08/2018 09/2018—12/2018 01/2019—02/2019 03/2019—09/2019
Company CAAR t statistic CAAR t statistic CAAR t statistic CAAR t statistic
Chinese Firms
Wens Foodstuff 4.21% 1.021 7.31%∗∗∗ 6.334 4.03%∗∗∗ 3.989 3.13%∗∗ 2.200
Muyuan Foodstuff -5.77% -1.616 2.31%∗ 1.732 0.98% 0.628 4.23%∗∗ 2.030
Zhengbang Tech. −3.30%∗∗ 2.014 12.72%∗∗∗ 11.203 27.00%∗∗∗ 6.974 4.31%∗∗ 1.964
Tech-Bank Food 1.69% 0.181 13.60%∗∗∗ 8.944 21.45%∗∗∗ 5.853 -2.59% -1.131
New Hope Group −2.82%∗∗∗ -3.126 6.34%∗∗∗ 12.091 15.75%∗∗∗ 5.163 6.14%∗∗∗ 3.421
Dabeinong Tech. −5.12%∗∗ -2.275 1.50%∗∗∗ 3.151 11.37%∗∗∗ 4.525 2.76% 0.808
Tangrenshen Group 2.26% -0.699 9.71%∗∗∗ 15.771 26.58%∗∗∗ 4.751 6.03%∗ 1.893
Tecon Animal Husbandry −9.70%∗∗∗ -9.612 1.69%∗∗ 2.454 15.59%∗∗∗ 8.355 3.96%∗ 1.784
New Wellful -0.54% -0.542 3.23%∗∗∗ 3.461 26.03%∗∗∗ 6.865 3.97%∗ 1.736
Kingsino Tech. 6.30%∗∗∗ 3.619 3.45%∗∗ 2.565 10.16%∗∗ 2.278 4.03% 1.584
All Chinese Firms −1.07%∗∗ -2.358 6.17%∗∗∗ 9.108 16.19%∗∗∗ 5.777 3.60%∗∗ 2.423
Foreign Firms
CPF -0.08% -0.157 3.95%∗∗∗ 7.601 1.85%∗ 1.674 2.47%∗∗ 2.212
Tyson Foods 3.95%∗∗ 2.304 -0.78% -1.201 2.10%∗∗ 2.009 3.22%∗∗∗ 3.021
Hormel Foods 7.83%∗∗∗ 4.531 3.43%∗∗∗ 5.053 -1.20% -1.567 -0.39% -0.514
Seaboard Foods −2.93%∗∗∗ -6.153 2.26%∗∗ 2.198 2.19%∗∗∗ 2.961 -0.46% -0.517
Maple Leaf Foods -0.09% -0.107 −2.91%∗∗∗ -4.682 −3.26%∗ -1.873 2.29%∗∗ 2.354
JBS S.A. 5.89%∗∗∗ 2.955 5.88%∗∗∗ 6.367 9.55%∗∗∗ 4.510 8.08%∗∗∗ 4.879
BRF S.A. 4.98% 1.263 2.12%∗∗ 2.250 1.35% 0.641 11.68%∗∗∗ 4.375
Atria Oyj −5.37%∗∗∗ -6.174 -2.26% -1.538 4.37%∗∗∗ 6.038 -1.54% -0.862
HKScan Oyj −9.62%∗ -1.811 −3.25%∗ -1.791 3.00%∗∗ 2.407 0.81% 0.464
Cherkizovo Group -2.90% -1.284 -0.79% -1.446 13.67%∗∗∗ 2.972 1.47% 1.374
Rusagro 2.60%∗ 1.692 4.09%∗∗∗ 6.324 -0.60% -0.514 -0.84% -1.517
Rus Grain 6.69%∗∗∗ 3.081 6.89%∗∗∗ 3.314 4.92%∗ 1.725 0.68% 0.509
Cranswick PLC -1.16% -0.691 −3.26%∗∗∗ -4.951 0.16% 0.052 -0.73% -0.723
Nomad Foods 0.21% 0.171 −1.79%∗∗ -2.538 3.21% 1.529 −2.25%∗∗ -2.364
Kerry Group PLC 1.09% 1.321 −1.37%∗∗∗ -3.393 1.26% 0.818 1.20% 0.273
All Foreign Firms 0.74% 0.074 0.80% -1.399 2.84%∗∗ 2.069 1.64%∗ 1.958
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The top panel presents individual test results for each of the 10 Chinese hog firms
and results for the average of all Chinese hog firms; the bottom panel presents individual test results for 15 foreign hog firms
and results for the average of all foreign hog firms. All CAAR values are calculated from the accumulation over 15 post-event
days (τ1 = 1, τ2 = 15).
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Table A.2: Publicly traded companies examined in this study
Ticker or Code Company Stock Exchange Country
300498 Wens Foodstuff Group Co. Ltd. Shanghai Stock Exchange China
002714 Muyuan Foods Co. Ltd. Shenzhen Stock Exchange China
002157 Zhengbang Technology Co. Ltd. Shenzhen Stock Exchange China
002124 Tech-bank Food Co. Ltd. Shenzhen Stock Exchange China
000876 New Hope Group Co. Ltd. Shenzhen Stock Exchange China
002385 Dabeinong Technology Group Co. Ltd. Shenzhen Stock Exchange China
002567 Tangrenshen Group Co. Ltd. Shenzhen Stock Exchange China
002100 Tecon Animal Husbandry Co. Ltd. Shenzhen Stock Exchange China
600975 New Wellful Co. Ltd. Shanghai Stock Exchange China
002548 Kingsino Technology Co. Ltd. Shenzhen Stock Exchange China
CPF Charoen Pokphand Foods Public Co. Ltd. Bangkok Stock Exchange Thailand
TSN Tyson Foods Inc. New York Stock Exchange USA
HRL Hormel Foods Corp. New York Stock Exchange USA
SEB Seaboard Foods Corp. NYSE American USA
MLFNF Maple Leaf Foods Inc. Toronto Stock Exchange Canada
JBSAY JBS S A/S ADR OTC Markets Brazil
BRFS BRF S.A. New York Stock Exchange Brazil
ATRAV Atria Oyj Helsinki Stock Exchange Finland
HKSAV HKScan Corp. Helsinki Stock Exchange Finland
GCHE Gruppa Cherkizovo PAO Moscow Exchange Russia
AGRO Ros Agro PLC Moscow Exchange Russia
RUGR Rusgrain Holding PAO Moscow Exchange Russia
CWK Cranswick PLC London Stock Exchange UK
NOMD Nomad Foods Ltd. New York Stock Exchange UK
KYGA Kerry Group PLC London Stock Exchange Ireland
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Figure A.1: Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of U.S. (top), Canadian (middle), and Brazilian
(bottom) companies with four important events in the U.S.-China trade war
Notes: For each panel, moving from left to right, the vertical short-dashed lines indicate: (1) On September
24, 2018, China responded to U.S. tariffs (US$200 billion worth of Chinese goods) with retaliatory tariffs
on US$60 billion worth of U.S. goods; (2) On December 1, 2018, the U.S. and China agreed to refrain from
increasing tariffs or imposing new ones for 90 days during the G20 Summit; (3) On June 1, 2019, China
increased tariffs imposed on about $60 billion of U.S. goods (a subset of $60 billion) in retaliation for the
Trump administration’s latest decision to increase duties on $200 billion worth of Chinese goods; and (4) In
the middle of the Huawei dispute between Canada and China, China halted all meat imports from Canada
over ”forged pork certificates” on June 26, 2019.
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